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This dissertation consists of two essays, which address the question of how
social interactions shape economic outcomes. The first essay examines crime and
criminal networks. The second one studies immigration, assimilation, and ethnic
enclaves.
The first essay offers a formal model of crime. Criminals often do not act
alone. Rather, they form networks of collaboration. How does law enforcement
affect criminal activity and structure of those networks? Using a network game, I
show that increased enforcement actually can lead to sparse networks and thereby
to an increase in criminal activity. When criminal activity requires a certain degree
of specialization, criminals will form sparse networks, which generate the highest
level of crime and are the hardest to disrupt. I also show that heavy surveillance
and large fines do not deter crime for these networks.
The second essay examines the impact that residential location decisions have
on economic outcomes of immigrants. About two thirds of the immigrants that
arrived to the United States between 1997 and 2006 settled in six States only. Using
a simultaneous-move game on residential choices I show that when all immigrants are
unskilled they cluster in an enclave and earn very low wages, although they would be
better off assimilating. Hence the enclave is ‘trap’. Introducing skill heterogeneity
among immigrants reverses the result: the enclave equilibrium becomes socially
preferred to assimilation.
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Criminals often do not act alone. Rather, they form networks of collaboration.
This chapter examines the impact of law enforcement on those networks and on the
resulting level of crime. I define a network as a group of criminals and the pattern
of communication links between them. Moreover, I refer to a sparse or diffused
network as one that connects a given number of criminals with the fewest links. I
find that sparsely connected networks generate the most crime and are the hardest to
dismantle. Also, within a diffused network, criminals who establish communication
links with the fewest other agents exert the highest level of crime effort. Sparse
networks generate the most crime, and even heavy surveillance and large fines do
not affect their shape or their level of criminal activity.
Criminal networks participate in a wide range of illegal activities, such as
drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and terrorism (Naim [22]). Many hierarchical
Mafia-like organizations have shifted their structure towards networks of loosely
aligned criminals (Williams [33]). For example, the Colombian cocaine trade, long
dominated by the cartels of Medelĺın and Cali, is now run by independent and spe-
cialized trafficking organizations in Colombia, Mexico, and the U.S.1 Decentralized
1For a description of the process of cocaine smuggling into the U.S., see INCSR reports of the
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crime networks are typically sparsely connected and very flexible. These features
allow them to be less visible and to change their structure constantly, which makes
it difficult for law enforcement to dismantle them (Reuter [25], Sageman [28] and
Williams [32]).
This chapter shows that, for a given number of criminals, those networks that
connect (directly or indirectly) all criminals with the fewest number of links yield the
highest level of crime. Within such sparsely connected network, criminals that have
few links are less visible to the police through connections, and supply high criminal
effort. Well-connected criminals, in contrast, exert low effort, instead providing
connections among distant agents. In networks that are densely connected, all
criminals face large penalties because of their large number of links, and thus they
optimally supply low effort.
To demonstrate these results, I analyze a simultaneous-move game in which
criminals in a given network independently select the amount of criminal effort to
exert. The basic model has three criminals; I compare the levels of crime generated
by all possible configurations of the network.2 I make the following assumptions:
First, no criminal can undertake illicit activity by himself: all agents need at least one
link to participate and to exert effort. Second, links allow criminals to coordinate on
their efforts and thus to derive spillover benefits. These effort spillovers are stronger
US Department of State [9]. On the cost associated with each phase of the cocaine smuggling
process see Reuter [26]. Fuentes [14] has a very detailed description of the Colombian cocaine
‘distribution’ cells operating in the US during the 1990s.
2In section 1.5 I extend the model to more than three criminals.
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between pairs of criminals who are more closely connected (in terms of path length).
Finally, the penalties from engaging in criminal activity increase with both the links
a criminal has and the amount of effort he supplies.
I show that if the effort spillovers are not too strong, then the static game has a
unique Nash Equilibrium. Suppose that well-connected criminals face a significantly
larger marginal cost of effort than do poorly-connected criminals. Then, within a
diffused network, well-connected criminals will supply less effort than criminals with
fewer links. When I compare crime levels across networks I find two features that
lead to the most crime: connectedness and sparseness of the network. Networks
that connect all criminals with the fewest possible links lead to the most crime.
Given that sparse networks generate the most crime, under what conditions do
they form? To address this question, I extend the model and allow criminals to form
links, and then to select the level of effort to exert. I find that diffused networks
are likely to emerge and can afford to pay large fines and face heavy surveillance by
the police. Further, when spillovers are sufficiently strong, large penalties do not
affect the structure of diffused networks or their level of crime.
This study contributes to the literature on the economic theory of networks,
and the economics of crime. Previous works by Calvó-Armengol and Zenou [6] and
Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou [2] studied the effect of social networks on
criminal behavior. The first paper shows that the decision among otherwise iden-
tical agents to get involved in crime depends on each agent’s position in the social
network. In the second paper, the authors develop a measure of centrality for
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each player (Bonacich measure) and ask how this measure affects the individual
choice of criminal effort. These papers are in line with the extensive literature on
the economics of crime, which focuses both at the theoretical and empirical levels
on the incentives for agents to engage in criminal activities.3 I depart from this
approach and assume that all agents are criminals, and study instead the decisions
that agents make on who to communicate with and how much crime effort to sup-
ply. This study is also related to the theoretical literature on drug markets, which
analyzes the effect that law enforcement policies have on agents situated at different
levels of the drug production and distribution chain, and ultimately on the number
of consumers in the streets (see for example Poret [23] and Chiu et al. [7]).
Adding to the previous literature, my work assumes that agents in the network
are criminals, who must collaborate with each other in the illicit activity. In my
model criminal efforts of all agents that are linked directly or indirectly are strategic
complements. Each criminal derives benefits from the collaboration through effort
spillovers. In Calvó-Armengol and Zenou [6] and Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and
Zenou [2] there are both local (direct neighbor) complementarities and global sub-
stitutabilities in criminal effort. The complementarities reflect peer effects, while
the substitutabilities reflect the competition for the booty among criminals who are
not connected directly.
By expanding our understanding of crime, this study can inform law enforce-
ment policy. The resiliency of decentralized crime networks requires crime fighting
3For a review of the literature on the economics of crime, see Freeman [12] and DiIulio [10].
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policies that differ from those targeted towards hierarchical organizations. In the
context of decentralized networks, changes in the penalties will affect the level of
crime and, more importantly, the structure. As the structure of a crime network
changes, law enforcement policies that were effective in the past may be useless. I
show that when effort complementarities are sufficiently strong, tougher penalties
do not discourage criminal behavior. Policies that target criminal activity and links
among criminals, rather than those links alone, are more effective in reducing crime.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I describe
a static game in which, for a given network, criminals strategically select criminal
effort. In Section 1.3, I solve for the Nash Equilibrium of the game, and compare
equilibrium outcomes across all networks with three criminals. In Section 1.4, I
specify a two-stage game: first criminals form links, and then they choose criminal
effort. I look for networks that are pairwise stable; i.e. ones in which no criminal
has the incentive to sever a link, and no unlinked pair wants to form a link (Jackson
and Wolinsky [17]). In Section 1.5, I extend the analysis to larger networks and
consider a dynamic process of network formation. Section 2.4 concludes.
1.2 Setup of the Game
There are three criminals. Denote the set of criminals by N = {1, 2, 3} and
index each agent by i = 1, 2, 3. A network g is the collection of communication
links between criminals (or nodes) that belong to N . Links allow criminals to
communicate and thereby coordinate on their crime efforts. A communication link
5
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Figure 1.1: Networks with three criminals
between agents i and j where i, j ∈ N is represented by gij = 1. If i and j are not
directly connected then gij = 0. I normalize gii = 0.
Given three criminals, there are four possible network configurations. The first
network is the empty network, where all criminals are isolated (Figure 1.1a). The
second network is the Single-Link Network, which has only two criminals linked.




23 = 0 (Figure 1.1b). The third
network is a Star represented by gS with gS12 = 1, g
S
23 = 1 and g
S
13 = 0. Here only one
criminal –the center of the Star– is directly linked to the other two nodes (Figure
1.1c). The last structure is the Complete network that has each agent connected
to every other agent (gC12 = 1, g
C
13 = 1 and g
C
23 = 1, Figure 1.1d).
I assume that agents are homogeneous and that the value of links only depends
on the network structure, not on the identity of agents. For example, a Star network
with gS12 = 1, g
S
23 = 1 and g
S
13 = 0 generates the same value as one with g
S
12 = 1,
gS13 = 1 and g
S
23 = 0.
The total number of links that agent i has in network g equals N gi =
∑
j∈N gij.




3 ] represent the profile of the number of links each
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criminal has.
To measure the distance between agents, let sgi = (si1, si2, si3) for i = 1, 2, 3.
Each element sit of the vector s
g
i corresponds to the inverse of the shortest distance
in network g between agents i and t. As a convention sii = 0. If i and t are
not connected (directly or indirectly) then sit = 0. The magnitude of sit depends
on the link pattern of the network and in particular, on the links that agent i has




3] be a symmetric matrix in which the it-th element
corresponds to sit.
Given a network g, criminals strategically select how much effort to exert.
Denote the criminal effort of agent i by egi .





profile of efforts of all criminals in network g. Define the level of criminal activity
of a network as the sum of efforts of all of its members. Crime and crime effort are
used interchangeably throughout.
The payoff to a criminal depends on his level of effort (egi ), his links (N
g
i ), other
criminals’ efforts (egj ), proximity to them (sij), and two law enforcement parameters.
The law enforcement parameters are a fine (f), and an intensity of law enforcement
(µ). For example, µ can be the probability that law enforcement will put under
surveillance any criminal.
4As a convention, subscripts refer to nodes or criminals (i), while superscripts refer to networks
(g).
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Given a network g, the payoff to criminal i equals:













i ;µ, f) (1.1)
Agents can participate in the criminal activity only if they are connected, i.e.
if N gi = 0 then e
g
i = 0, and Y
g
i = 0. More precisely, I normalize to zero the payoff
of a criminal that has no links. Thus the effort that a linked criminal supplies is
interpreted as the additional crime effort driven by the gains from coordination and
communication with other criminals.
The first term in (1.1) is the private benefit derived from own links and own
effort. Even if all other criminals in the network exert minimal or no effort, agent
i still benefits from his connections (B(ei, N
g
i ) > 0 even if ∀j ∈ N , e
g
j = 0). B(.)
is increasing in all of its terms and is weakly concave in effort: ∂B
∂egi






2 ≤ 0. And, having more links makes own effort more productive. Thus











j , sij; γ) is increasing in own effort (e
g
i ), other criminals’ efforts














The most important assumption of the model is that ei and ej are strategic com-
plements. The strength of these complementarities is measured by the parameter
γ > 0, i.e. ∂
2K(.)
∂ei∂ej
= h(γ, .) > 0 and ∂h
∂γ
> 0. If each node has a very particular
skill or knowledge that vastly enhances the value of the criminal effort put in by all
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others in the network, then γ is large. When γ is small effort complementarities
are weak and the gains from collaboration are small. Moreover, stronger spillovers




The last term in (1.1), π(egi , N
g
i ;µ, f), is the cost of engaging in a criminal
activity. The law enforcement parameter µ affects the likelihood that a criminal
will get caught. A criminal who gets caught by the police must pay an exogenous
fine f . Thus I interpret the function π(egi , N
g
i ;µ, f) as the fine payment. The cost
of engaging in criminal activity is increasing in egi , N
g
i , and in the law enforcement






> 0 and ∂π
∂f
> 0. Further the fine
payment is strictly convex in egi , i.e.
∂2π
∂(egi )
2 > 0. Larger penalties increase the cost
of additional effort: ∂
2π
∂egi ∂f
> 0 and ∂
2π
∂egi ∂µ
> 0. Even at the margin, increases in the
fine ( f) and in the intensity of law enforcement (µ) act as criminal deterrents by
raising the marginal cost of criminal effort. And, heavier penalties are more costly
to criminals with more links: ∂
2π
∂Ngi ∂f




I am interested in examining how law enforcement policies shape criminal
effort choices in a given network. The fine (f) and the probability of surveillance
(µ) affect Nash Equilibrium efforts through π(egi , N
g
i ;µ, f), the cost of being part
of a crime network. I assume that criminals with more links find it more costly






0. For any given effort level, having more links increases the likelihood of being
captured. Within a network, well connected criminals are more visible to the police
because of these links. This visibility gives them the incentive to supply less effort
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than sparsely connected agents. For example, if all criminals in the Star network
exert the same level of effort, then increasing it marginally is more costly for the
center of the Star than for the corners.
Each criminal in the network faces a tradeoff between the benefit from effort
coordination and the cost associated to getting caught. A well-connected crimi-
nal coordinates on efforts with several other criminals, and thereby derives larger
spillover benefits than a poorly connected agent does. However, holding the effort
level fixed, a well-connected criminal is also more likely get caught through links
than a criminal with fewer connections.
To motivate the model, consider the following situation. Suppose that the
process of drug smuggling consists of three phases: processing the coca leaf into
cocaine, smuggling the cocaine into the foreign country (e.g. the U.S.) and finally,
distributing and retailing it. Now assume that each of these activities is undertaken
by a different agent within the crime network. The first agent is the producer
or Colombian drug-lord, the second agent is the smuggler, and the third is the
distributor or dealer. The criminal effort of the drug-lord includes such activities
as growing the coca and then refining it to produce the cocaine. Hence egi refers to
effort put into the criminal activity itself, and it excludes any action to avoid being
captured by the police.
The intuition behind the assumptions of the model are as follows for this ex-
ample: Criminals must have at least one link to participate in the criminal activity.
Therefore, the drug-lord needs connections either with the smuggler or the distrib-
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utor or both in order to derive a non-zero benefit from his economic activity. Recall
that the crime effort of an isolated criminal is normalized to zero. For example,
when the drug-lord has no connections he goes to the spot market and has an anony-
mous transaction with a smuggler. In such a transaction there are no benefits from
effort spillovers or from connections. Therefore the value of that transaction is
no larger than that of a transaction in which the drug-lord and the smuggler agree
on the packaging and the delivery time of the cocaine. Further, the more links a
criminal has, the larger his marginal benefit from effort. Suppose that the smuggler
marginally increases the amount of cocaine brought illegally into the U.S. Then his
marginal benefit is larger when he is connected to two dealers than one.
The key assumption of the model is effort spillovers. In this scenario one
example would be: The Colombian drug-lord makes an R&D investment that allows
him to process better quality/high-purity cocaine at a low cost. This improvement
in quality gives the distributor/dealer the incentive to search for customers who
are willing to pay a premium for the high-purity cocaine. The dealer responds
to the increased R&D effort of the drug-lord by supplying more effort. These
marginal increases in effort become more productive if the traffickers use electronic
communications that are encrypted and thus very secure (γ increases). Then it
becomes harder for the police to tap into their communications. Such a change
gives criminals the incentive to collaborate more closely with each other (i.e. a
marginal increase in γ raises the marginal benefit of egi ).
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1.3 The Game: Strategic Criminal Effort Choices
I specify a simultaneous-move game as follows. For a given network g, each
criminal i selects egi to maximize his own payoff. For a given network, criminals
play a simultaneous move game in criminal efforts. I compare Nash Equilibrium
(NE) efforts across all network configurations shown in Figure 1.1.





From (1.1) the payoff to criminal i in network g is:





K(ei, ej, sij; γ)− π(ei, N gi ;µ, f) (1.2)





















= 0∀i ∈ N
Given that the strategy sets are one-dimensional (effort levels), and that pay-
offs are continuous and concave in effort, the following condition guarantees that a













∀i ∈ N (1.4)
When this inequality is satisfied, Best Response functions are contraction mappings,
and the system of first-order conditions given by (1.3) has a unique solution (Fried-
man [13] and Vives [30]). A property of this Nash Equilibrium is symmetry: agents
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in identical structural positions in the network adopt the same strategy. For ex-
ample, at the NE, players in the corners of the Star (Figure 1.1c) exert the same
amount of criminal effort. The inequalities in (1.4) suggest that the Best Response
of criminal i changes proportionately more with a marginal increase in own effort
(egi ) than with a similar increase in other criminals’ effort (e
g
j ). Conditions in (1.4)
hold if the network effects (γ) are not too strong, and if the cost of engaging in crim-
inal activity is sufficiently convex in own effort. When the effort complementarities
are very strong, then an individual might choose either to supply almost no effort
at all, given that any small and positive amount of effort is extremely productive or
to supply very high effort that feeds back through larger efforts of all others in the
network. Thus if γ is too large, then the game can have multiple equilibria.
Let γ̄ be the largest γ for which a unique Nash Equilibrium exists. The
following analysis applies for all γ ≤ γ̄.
The first result of the model is that within a network criminals with few links
exert more effort than those with more links. Well-connected criminals are more
likely to be captured because of their links and they choose to supply low effort. In
contrast, criminals with few links are less visible through the links and can exert
more effort. Within a network, when the penalties for engaging in criminal activity
depend on both egi and N
g
i criminals who have few links supply more effort than
well-connected agents. The next proposition formalizes the result.




> 0 is sufficiently large. Then
13
within a network, sparsely connected criminals exert more effort than those with
more links.
Proof. All proofs are in Appendix A.















. This assumption suggests that a criminal who is well connected
faces a higher marginal cost of effort and a lower marginal benefit relative to an agent
that is poorly connected. If two criminals who differ in their number of links face the





= 0), then it would be more profitable for the
well-connected criminal to increase his effort relative to the poorly connected agent
(the effort spillover benefits of the latter are lower). Furthermore, the well-connected
criminal, by exerting marginally more effort, leads to stronger effort spillovers that
feed back to everyone else in the network. This feed back translates into more crime
than that which would result from a poorly-connected agent increasing his effort.
If instead, the marginal cost of effort increases with the number of connections,
say because a ‘tax’ is imposed on each link, then a well-connected criminal has the
incentive to supply less effort than a poorly-connected individual (see the Star in
Figure 1.1c). The ‘tax’ on links leads to a decentralization of crime effort in the
network: criminals that are sparsely connected supply more effort than criminals
with more links. In my model the penalties play the role of the ‘tax’.
The system of first order conditions given by (1.3) yield Nash Equilibrium
efforts of the form eg∗i = ei(N
g, sg; γ, µ, f) for all i ∈ N in g. These NE efforts
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are increasing in the strength of spillover effects (γ) , and are decreasing in the
law enforcement parameters (µ and f).5 Stronger spillovers increase the marginal
benefit of effort and lead to higher eg∗i . In contrast, tougher fines (f) or better
surveillance technology (µ) make criminal effort more costly to exert and lead to
smaller eg∗i .
For example, in the Star network in Figure 1.1c players 1 and 3 have only one




3 ). Further, agents 1 and 3 are
symmetric: each is a step away from player 2 and two steps away from the other.
Then the NE efforts of the Star network are e∗center < e
∗
corner for corner = 1, 3.
Criminals that are sparsely connected select higher effort levels than well connected
criminals.
Proposition 1.1 illustrates the role of asymmetries between spillovers and in-
dividual effort costs in shaping optimal effort choices. Links let criminals maximize
the benefit of effort spillovers. But having more links increases the chance of get-
ting caught. Less-connected criminals have a lower probability of being captured
through links, and derive lower spillover benefits due to indirect connections. Given
the strong effect of links on the marginal cost of effort and the large penalties, less-
connected criminals supply more effort than their counterparts.
For a fixed level of effort, the direct benefits (B(ei, N
g
i )) from participating
in the network are larger for criminals with more links. Similarly, spillovers are
5These properties are derived using the assumptions on the cross-partial derivatives and the
concavity of Y gi on e
g
i , and by totally differentiating the system of first-order conditions (1.3).
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greater for well-connected criminals: they tend to have higher sij’s that make∑
j 6=i,j∈N K(ei, ej, sij; γ) large. Meanwhile, the cost of engaging in criminal activity
is increasing in both ei and N
g
i . For a given effort level, having more links increases
the probability of getting caught and paying a fine. Given the strong complemen-
tarities between egi and N
g
i in π(.) and the tough penalties for crime, well-connected
criminals will supply less criminal effort than their counterparts in equilibrium.
Large penalties linked to egi and N
g
i drive well-connected criminals to supply
little effort, and instead channel spillovers among otherwise distant nodes. Those
that exert more effort communicate or have links with few criminals. Thus, better
connected nodes are not the most dangerous (in terms of crime effort level).
I now derive the central result: that sparse networks generate the most crime.
Sparse networks that (directly or indirectly) connect all criminals with the fewest
links yield the highest level of crime. In a sparse network, criminals with few
links can exert high effort. Their high effort will feed back to the well-connected
criminals through spillovers and will lead them to increase their own effort as well.
In contrast, in a densely-connected network all criminals face a high probability of
getting caught because of the links and optimally supply low effort.
Proposition 1.2. Let γ ≤ γ̄. Suppose that B(.) and π(.) are homogenous of degree
one in links. Then sparse networks connecting all agents induce the highest (NE)









eC∗i ≥ eI∗i .
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Sparser networks motivate criminals to supply more effort than they would
in more densely connected networks with the same number of nodes.6 In diffused
networks, criminals at the periphery exert the most effort; this feeds back through
spillovers to agents who are densely connected, and induces them to supply high
effort. Thus e∗center > e
C∗
i , and consequently, e
S∗ > eC∗.
The second result of proposition 1.2 (eC∗i ≥ eI∗i ) follows from the homogeneity
of B(.) and π(.) in links and from the spillover benefits. The homogeneity assump-
tion implies that if criminal i has one link and criminal j has two links, then B(.)
and π(.) are twice as large for criminal j as for criminal i. In both the single-link
and the Complete network, connected criminals are only one step away from each
other; thus sij = s = 1 for all connected criminals. Given that all players in the
Complete network have identical positions, I can use this symmetry to calculate the
effort spillovers for criminal i as 2K(ei, ej, s, γ). Similarly, the spillover benefit of
a connected player in the Single-link network is K(ei, ej, s, γ). Then the payoffs to
criminals in the Complete network are an increasing monotonic transformation of
the payoffs to connected players in the single-link network. Hence eI∗i = e
C∗
i for
N Ii > 0. The gains from spillovers and private benefits in the complete network
relative to the single-link network (BC + KC = 2(BI + KI)) fully offset the higher
costs of links (πC = 2πI).
If, contrary to the assumptions above, the costs of participating in a crime
6This result requires the connected components of both networks to have the same number of
nodes. A connected component is a set of nodes that are linked, either directly or indirectly.
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network increase in own effort only while the benefits increase both in effort and
links, then well-connected criminals would choose to exert the most effort. Conse-
quently, more densely connected networks would turn out to be the most dangerous





1.4 Decentralized Link Formation
If sparse networks are associated with the most crime, when should we expect
these networks to emerge? To answer this question, let us now suppose that pairs
of criminals must agree to form links. While two criminals agree to a link, either
one can sever it unilaterally. I extend the basic model and specify a two-stage game.
Fix (γ, f, µ) and let γ ≤ γ̄. First criminals form links.7 A network emerges and is
publicly observed. Then, given the network structure, criminals strategically select
levels of criminal effort . I solve the game using ‘backward induction.’ Given the
NE efforts of the second stage of the game, criminal i in network g anticipates in
the first stage a payoff equal to Y gi (N




i ; γ, µ, f). I look for
networks that are pairwise stable. This equilibrium concept is developed by Jackson
and Wolinsky [17]. A network is pairwise stable if no pair of unlinked agents agree
to a new link and if no agent wants to unilaterally sever a link.
7I assume that the cost of forming a link is zero (i.e. c = 0). The results do not change
significantly if I let c > 0.
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1.4.1 Pairwise Stability
Start with network g. Suppose that previously unlinked criminals i and j add
a link to g. Denote the new structure as g+ ij. Let g− ij be the resulting network
when the existing link gij is removed (i.e. gij = 0.)
A network g is pairwise stable (PWS) if:
(1) ∀gij = 1, Y gi (Ng, sg; .) ≥ Y
g−ij
i (N
g−ij, sg−ij; .) and
Y gj (N
g, sg; .) ≥ Y g−ijj (Ng−ij, sg−ij; .); and
(2) ∀gij = 0, if Y g+iji (Ng+ij, sg+ij; .) > Y
g
i (N
g, sg; .) then Y g+ijj (N
g+ij, sg+ij; .) <
Y gj (N
g, sg; .).
The first condition says that no agent wants to sever a link in g. The second
condition says that no pair of agents gain by forming a new link. Criminals will
form or sever links only if they can earn a larger payoff with the deviation. Pairwise
stability allows at most two criminals to coordinate on forming a link. Thus, the
link formation process is decentralized. For example, the Star network is PWS
if: 1) criminals at the corners optimally do not form a link (i.e. Ycorner(N
S, sS; .) >
Y Ci (N
C , sC ; .)); 2) the player at the center optimally does not sever either of his links
(Ycenter(N
S, sS; γ, µ, f) > Y Iconnected(N
I , sI ; .)); and 3) no corner optimally severs his
link (Ycorner(N
S, sS; .) > 0).
I apply PWS to the link formation game.
Let the fine payment be π(eg∗i , N
g




i ; f) +φ(N
g
i , µ, f). Under
this specification criminals get caught either because they exert high criminal effort
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and thereby increase their visibility to the police (ρ(eg∗i , N
g
i ; f)), or because they
are put under surveillance (φ(N gi , µ, f)). When a criminal supplies high effort, and
this effort gets him caught, he pays a fine equal to ρ(eg∗i , N
g
i ; f) . To illustrate the
intuition of this penalty consider the following example: Suppose that the amount
of effort an agent puts into committing a crime is an increasing function of the
fraction of time he spends on criminal activity. The higher the effort, the more
time an agent spends on criminal activity, the more likely the police will observe
and capture him (i.e. ρ(eg∗i , N
g
i ; f) is increasing in e
g∗
i ). Moreover, for any given
effort level, the cost of exerting effort is larger for criminals with more links because
they are more visible to the police (i.e. ρ(eg∗i , N
g
i ; f) is also increasing in N
g∗
i ). A
criminal also can get caught if he is put under surveillance, in which case he pays a
fine equal to φ(N gi , µ, f). We can imagine that the probability of a criminal being
put under surveillance is increasing in the number of links he has (i.e. φ(N gi , µ, f) is
increasing in N gi ). In this situation, the police need not observe a criminal engaging
in crime in order to fine him. Links are enough to punish a criminal who is under
surveillance. For example, the surveillance could consist of the police tapping into
the communications of a criminal. Once the police intercept the communications of
a criminal, he is captured and pays a fine accordingly. 8
8A more intuitive specification is π(egi , N
g




i , µ)f . Here a criminal is captured
only if, conditional on being under surveillance, he is observed in criminal activity. Suppose that
the network is put under surveillance with some exogenous probability µ ∈ (0, 1). Then the
probability that criminal i is put under surveillance is φ(Ngi , µ) ∈ (0, 1), with φ(.) increasing in all
of its arguments. Let ρ(egi ) ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that the police observe a criminal while




For a given network g and its corresponding NE crime efforts, criminal i an-
ticipates a payoff in the first period equal to :
Y gi (N



















j , sij; γ)− (1.6)
[ρ(eg∗i , N
g
i ; f) + φ(N
g
i , µ, f)]
When π(eg∗i , N
g




i ; f) + φ(N
g
i , µ, f) NE crime efforts in (1.5) are
independent of the intensity of law enforcement (µ): eg∗i = e
g
i (N
g, sg; γ, f).9 High µ
discourages link formation without affecting effort choices. µ can be interpreted as
the ability of law enforcement to tap into the communications of the criminals.
For more precise results, I use a specific functional form. Consider the follow-
ing payoff function:























for i 6= j 6= k and i, j, k = 1, 2, 3. N̄ = 6 is the largest possible number of links
in a network with three players. Let egi ∈ (0, 1). This function is a particular
representation of (1.5). The first term (N gi e
g
i ) is the private benefit of own links
(N gi ) and effort (e
g
i ). The second and third terms are the benefits from spillovers.









µf are the cost of engaging in criminal behavior.
Here, the probability of surveillance is independent of the amount of effort a criminal
9 It turns out that in the specification of the fine payment in the previous footnote NE efforts
are functions of both µ and f , which make the analysis of PWS networks less tractable than with
the specification in (1.5).
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exerts. The higher the effort of a criminal, the more likely he is to get caught.







f increases with N gi and e
g
i ). Additionally, criminals with more




with N gi ).
With the functional form in (1.7) I can characterize all PWS networks using
an algorithm that I construct in Matlab.10 I find that if the penalties for engaging
in criminal activity (µ and f) are large enough to drive the payoffs of all networks
with at least one link negative, then the only PWS network is the empty network.
Let the range of fines (f) be such that there are some values of (γ, µ) for which
the payoffs in networks with links are non-negative. I now derive the third main
result. Sparse networks with a high degree of specialization lead to the highest
level of crime and are the hardest to dismantle. They can sustain even very large
fines and heavy surveillance. If γ is sufficiently large, then the Star network forms
regardless of the level of f and µ.
Proposition 1.3. Fix the fine f and let γ ≤ γ̄.11 If spillovers are sufficiently strong
(γ close to γ̄), then diffused networks can sustain heavy surveillance by the police
and large fines. These features make sparse networks hard to disrupt. Diffused
networks have the fewest possible number of links and connect (directly or indirectly)
all criminals. These networks decrease the probability and the cost of getting caught,
10The Matlab code is available upon request.

































Figure 1.2: PWS networks for a fixed fine f = 150
and achieve the highest level of criminal activity.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 1.2 the single-link network is never
PWS (Figure 1.2). At least one of the conditions required for PWS is never met.12
Criminals either prefer to belong to a network with a larger connected component
or not to be connected at all. For some combinations of (γ, µ), the Star and the
Empty networks are mutually PWS.
Regardless of the level of surveillance (µ) and for some fixed fine f , if effort
12The single-link network is PWS if: 1) no connected criminal wants to sever his link
(Y Iconnected(N
I , sI ; γ, µ) > 0) and 2) the isolated criminal and a connected one don’t agree to
a link (Y Iconnected(N
I , sI ; γ, µ) > Ycenter(NS , sS ; γ, µ) and Ycorner(NS , sS ; γ, µ) < 0).
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complementarities are strong (i.e. γ close to γ̄), then criminals form the Star net-
work. When γ is large and close to γ̄, all criminals have an incentive to connect
with the fewest links possible: a high γ leads to large NE crime efforts, and high
levels of effort increase the cost of engaging in criminal activity. Anticipating high
effort in the second stage, criminals will choose to form a diffused network in the
first stage. This choice translates into the highest possible level of crime.
1.4.2 Policy Interventions
How do changes in law enforcement policies affect the network structure and
its level of crime?
Using the functional form in (1.7), I fix the strength of the spillovers (γ) and
analyze how changes in the intensity of law enforcement (µ) alters the network
structure.13 Let µg belong to the set of surveillance probabilities in which network
g is PWS. If spillovers are weak, then law enforcement policies targeted towards
very densely connected networks lead to more crime.
Set γ = γlow as in Figure 1.2. For such γlow, the Complete, the Star and
the Empty network are all PWS for some range of µ. Law enforcement intensities
for which each of these networks is PWS can be ranked as follows: µC < µS ≤
µempty. From Proposition 1.2 eC∗ < eS∗ and eS∗ > 0. Thus, for low values of γ,
13In the future I would like to look at how varying the fine (f) affects crime. This case is slightly
more complicated than that in which f is fixed and µ varies. When f changes it affects not only
the network structure but also NE crime efforts.
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increases in the surveillance activity can be counterproductive. If the change in the
surveillance probability is not large enough to make some criminals drop out, then
the resulting network yields more crime. Increases in the penalties for engaging in
criminal activity can increase crime. As the complete network becomes sparser, the
probability of getting caught through links decreases for some criminals, and overall
criminal activity goes up.
1.5 Larger Populations of Criminals
Using the specific functional form of the payoffs in (1.7), I analyze in this
section the behavior of large populations of criminals. Now there are |N | criminals
for N = {1, 2, 3, ...}. The largest possible number of links in a network with |N |
criminals is N̄ = |N | ∗ (|N |− 1). Following (1.7) the payoff to criminal i in network
g is:






















To obtain the following results I construct an algorithm for large populations
of criminals using Matlab. I solve the game as follows. I start at the second-stage:
given a network structure g, I solve for the NE criminal efforts, which maximize
(1.8) for all i ∈ N . Then I turn to the first-stage of the game and find the networks
that are PWS.
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1.5.1 Equilibrium Crime in Large Populations
Within a large network, criminals with fewer links exert more effort than those
with more links. Note that B = N gi e
g










of degree one in links. Then from Proposition 1.2 it follows that the NE crime
efforts of a Complete network with |N | criminals are described by eC∗i . And the
aggregate crime level of a Complete network is eC∗ = |N | eC∗i , which is increasing in
|N |.
When networks with more than three criminals are considered, there can be
several connected components. Intuitively, a connected component is a group of
nodes that are linked to each other either directly or indirectly. Whether i and j
belong to the same connected component can be seen by looking at sij: if sij > 0
then i and j are in the same connected component. If sij = 0, then i and j are not
connected (directly or indirectly).
Networks sparser than the Complete, and such that ∀i ∈ N , N gi > 0, yield at
least the same level of aggregate crime as the Complete network. Suppose there
exists some large network g that has at least two connected components. If each of
the components is maximally connected, – i.e. if within a component each criminal
can reach every other criminal in just one step– then the level of criminal activity
of this network is identical to that of a Complete network with the same number of
agents. For example, suppose that g′ is a Complete network with four criminals.
Let g′′ be such that it only has two links, g′′12 = 1 and g
′′
34 = 1. Then the NE crime
efforts of g′ and g′′ coincide.
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Fix |N | > 3. Suppose that there are two networks g′ and g′′ and that both
networks have a single connected component linking all criminals. Using the algo-
rithm in Matlab for larger populations of criminals, I find that if g′ can be obtained
by cutting links from g′′ and if g′ and g′′ differ significantly on their link density,
then the sparser structure g′ leads to more crime.
1.5.2 Pairwise Stable Networks in Large Populations
After calculating the NE efforts for a given network structure, I turn to the
first stage and ask which network is likely to emerge. I fix f and let (γ, µ) vary.14
Using the existence results of Jackson and Watts [16] I know that for any (γ , µ)
there exists at least a PWS network or a closed cycle of networks. In the case of
three criminals, for any pair (γ , µ) there always exists a PWS network and there
are no closed cycles. With larger populations of criminals, I can find combinations
of (γ , µ) for which no PWS network exists. The absence of a PWS network for
such pairs of (γ , µ) raises the possibility of having cycling networks in these areas
of the parameter space.
Consider the following dynamic process of link formation proposed by Jackson
and Watts [16]: A set of N criminals form network g. In each period t a pair (i, j)
is selected with some positive probability pij where
∑
ij pij = 1. Criminals i and
j either can form a link, resulting in network g′ = g + ij, or each can sever the
link gij = 1 so that g
′ = g − ij. In every period, a pair of criminals is randomly
14Again, set f = 150 and z = 1.
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selected and decides whether to form a link or to sever an existing link.15 If a
dynamic process that starts from network g leads with strictly positive probability
to network g′, then an improving path exists from g to g′. A closed cycle C is a
set of networks such that for any g, g′ ∈ C there exists an improving path from g to
g′ and all networks in the path also belong to C. Networks that are PWS in the
static game are always reached in this dynamic process.
Applying the existence results of Jackson and Watts [16] , for any combination
(γ, µ) there is at least a PWS network or a closed cycle. We can find ranges of (γ, µ)
in which there are closed cycles and/or PWS networks. And in regions for which
no network is PWS, criminal activity is going on through cycling networks. For
example, let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Start at network g with g12 = g13 = 1 and gi4 = 0
for i = 1, 2, 3. A cycle can exist over some range of (γ, µ) as follows: player 1
severs link g13 so that the new network g
′ has just one link g′12 = 1. Then criminals
3 and 4 connect and g′′ forms with g′′12 = 1 and g
′′
34 = 1. Next, players 2 and 3




34 = 1. Finally, players 3 and 4 are
selected and player 3 severs the link g′′′34 = 1. This leads back to the original network
g12 = g13 = 1. Similar examples can be constructed for larger networks.
15This process is myopic because when pairs of agents are deciding on forming or a severing link,
they do not take into account future decisions of other agents to alter the resulting network g′.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter of the dissertation I construct a network model that captures
the strategic interactions among criminals who jointly engage in an illicit activity.
This theoretical framework is appropriate for understanding how decentralized crime
networks operate and how they react to changes in law enforcement policies.
I specify a static game in which for a given network, criminals select the level of
effort to exert. I solve the game for all possible network configurations and compare
the levels of crime generated. My first result is that, within a diffused network,
sparsely connected criminals are the most dangerous. When I compare crime across
networks that differ in their link density, I get my second result: networks that are
sparsely connected yield the highest level of crime. From a policy perspective,
densely connected networks thus should be preferred to diffused networks.
I then extend the model and allow criminals to form links endogenously. Using
a specific functional form, I find that the degree of specialization of a network
determines its resiliency to law enforcement policies. My third result suggests
that sparse networks with a high degree of specialization, or strong spillovers, are
very hard to dismantle. Even large fines and heavy surveillance can be ineffective
in altering their structure or their level of crime.
Finally, I derive results for larger populations of criminals. I observe that effort
choices within a larger network resemble those of networks with three criminals.
Extending the result that sparse networks yield more crime to larger populations of
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criminals requires comparing networks that differ significantly in their link density.
The model provides intuition on how crime networks operate. In the drug
trafficking example, once the kingpins of the Colombian cartels were killed or put
behind bars in the early 1990s, new drug-lords started to emerge. In contrast to
the kingpins, these new drug-lords chose to maintain a low profile in order to reduce
their visibility to law enforcement. They opted to stay small and to collaborate
instead with criminal organizations in Mexico and the U.S. During the second
half of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century this partnership was
coupled with a steady increase in the total amount of cocaine smuggled into the U.S.
Looser and more decentralized structures raised the volume of the cocaine smuggled.
The collaboration between criminals is not exclusive to the drug-smuggling business,
many illicit activities have led criminals to form decentralized networks (e.g. human
smuggling, arms smuggling, and terrorism).
The analysis offered is just a beginning in terms of our understanding of crime
networks. Two avenues are worth exploring in the future. The first is letting
law enforcement be a strategic player in the game. We could imagine a (repeated)
three-stage game proceeding as follows. In the first stage, the police announce the
penalties for engaging in criminal behavior and the intensity of law enforcement.
Then, criminals form links and the network structure is publicly observed. Finally,
in the third-stage, criminals choose effort given a network structure. If the degree of
specialization of the network is publicly known, then the police set penalties in the
first stage that will lead to the lowest level of crime, and the game will end. If the
30
degree of specialization of the network is not known to the police, then the police
and the criminals will interact repeatedly. Through repeated interaction, the police
will learn the degree of specialization of the network by observing its structure and
its level of crime, and respond by changing the penalties accordingly.
The second avenue to explore relates to the consequences of the strength of
effort spillovers within a crime network. I showed that when the effort spillovers
are sufficiently strong, sparse networks form and further, they are very hard to
dismantle. This result is relevant to the extent that crime networks are highly
specialized, so that effort spillovers are strong. To better understand the role of
specialization, for example, we could allow for heterogeneity in the value of the links
according to the identity (and skills) of each of the criminals. This exercise could
guide crime fighting policy.
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Chapter 2
Immigration, Assimilation and Ethnic Enclaves
2.1 Introduction
Residential clustering by immigrants, i.e. the formation of ethnic enclaves,
is fairly common in the United States: about two thirds of the immigrants that
arrived between 1997 and 2006 settled in six States only (California, New York,
Florida, Texas, New Jersey and Illinois).1 This chapter examines the impact that
residential location decisions have on economic outcomes of immigrants. I introduce
a simultaneous-move game in which immigrants decide whether to settle among
natives and assimilate or to cluster and form an ethnic enclave. The results of the
model show that the skill mix within the enclave (or the ‘quality’ of the enclave)
shapes the economic outcomes of immigrants. If all immigrants are unskilled and if
an equilibrium exists in which the enclave forms, then it is trap or a bad equilibrium.
In contrast, if both skilled and unskilled immigrants move to the enclave, I find
that the enclave equilibrium is socially preferred to that in which all immigrants
assimilate. And regardless of where unskilled immigrants locate, their wages are
higher if a positive fraction of skilled co-ethnics settle in the enclave.
Previous literature in immigration suggests that the benefits and costs of liv-
1According to the Immigration Statistics of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This
calculation takes into account legal residents only.
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ing in an enclave depend on the quality of the enclave (see for example Borjas [5]
and Edin et al. [11]). In this chapter I propose a model with skill heterogeneity
among immigrants. In the model skilled immigrants who settle the enclave become
entrepreneurs and hire unskilled co-ethnics. This assumption allows me to assess
the quality of an enclave in terms both of the availability of jobs and the value
of the output produced in it. I make the following additional assumptions: first,
there are language complementarities in production (both in the enclave and out of
it); second, immigrants that settle among natives are more likely to assimilate than
those who live in the enclave; third, immigrants that assimilate earn higher wages
in the general labor market (because of stronger language complementarities with
natives). Finally, unskilled immigrants who work in the enclave eventually become
self-employed, and thus gain upward mobility without assimilation.2
I specify a simultaneous-move game in residential location decisions. First,
immigrants choose where to live. If some skilled people go to the enclave then a
labor market emerges in it; and in that case, immigrants decide whether to work
in the enclave or in the general labor market. I solve for the Nash Equilibria of
the game. I start by studying residential location decisions of a pool of identical
unskilled immigrants. I find, first, if the benefits from assimilation (other than
higher wages) are rather small, then unskilled immigrants do not assimilate and
earn very low wages. Second, if native employers cannot tell apart unskilled immi-
grants who assimilate, and if the wages for assimilated unskilled immigrants are not
2In the enclave workers receive on-the-job training and informal advice from the entrepreneurs,
and eventually start their own businesses.
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sufficiently large, then all unskilled immigrants cluster in the enclave, which emerges
as a poverty trap.
I then ask whether entrepreneurship in the enclave improves the economic
outcomes of unskilled immigrants who settle in it. The model yields the following
set of results. First, no enclave exists in which there is excess labor demand. Skilled
immigrants move to the enclave only if the supply of labor in it is abundant. One
plausible explanation for this outcome is that the value of assimilation is correlated
with skill. Second, if the enclave ever forms, then it is socially preferred to the
assimilation equilibrium. Once skilled immigrants settle in the enclave, it is no
longer a poverty trap. Hence the quality of the enclave matters when studying
the economic outcomes of immigrants who cluster. Third, ethnic enclaves and
ethnic enterprises improve the economic outcomes not only of immigrants that live
in the enclave, but also of those who live out of it. The demand for labor in the
enclave soaks up part or all of the unskilled (unassimilated) labor supply, and allows
unskilled immigrants that assimilate to earn wages comparable to those of natives in
the general labor market. Finally, better quality enclaves allow unskilled immigrants
to achieve upward mobility faster.
This study contributes to the literature on immigration. By accounting for
the ‘quality’ of an enclave I am able to explain the wide set of experiences of diverse
immigrant groups in the U.S.3 Empirical studies in the economics of immigration
3Sociologists have studied extensively the immigrant enclaves in the U.S. See for example Light
and Gold [20] and Portes and Rumbaut [27].
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have shown that the quality of an enclave matters. For example Edin et al. [11]
examine the economic outcomes of refugee immigrants in Sweden and find that those
who live in enclaves with high rates of self-employment have positive returns from
living there, while people who settle in enclaves with mostly unskilled individuals
experience lower earnings possibly due to clustering itself.4 Finally Borjas [5] reports
that people who settle in the enclaves and do not acquire the social norms and skills
of the U.S. (i.e. assimilate), have wages growing at a slower pace than that of the
rest of the population.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2, describes a
simultaneous-move game in which unskilled immigrants choose where to live. I
solve for the Nash Equilibria in residential location decisions. In Section 2.3, I
incorporate skilled immigrants and introduce a labor market in the enclave. Then
I solve for the Nash equilibria and Pareto-rank them. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 A Game of Residential Clustering
2.2.1 Setup
Suppose there exists a continuum of unskilled immigrants with unit measure
that arrive to a large metropolitan area in the U.S. Each person decides indepen-
dently and noncooperatively whether to settle in a neighborhood with his co-ethnics
or in an area where the majority of the population is native. The location decision
4In their study of the Cuban and Haitian enclaves in Miami Portes and Stepick [24] reach a
similar conclusion.
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determines the likelihood that a person assimilates: I assume that an immigrant is
more likely to assimilate if he chooses to live among natives than if he settles with
his co-ethnics. The intuition for this assumption is as follows. As in Lazear [19]
we could imagine a situation in which individuals can trade only if they speak the
same language. Immigrants can assimilate in order to expand their pool of poten-
tial trading partners. The incentive to assimilate is stronger for people who live
and work among natives than for those who settle with co-ethnics. I also assume
that immigrants who acquire the skills and speak the language of the host country
earn higher wages in the general labor market. Thus in my model assimilation, or
equivalently living among natives, leads to upward economic mobility. In contrast,
residential clustering of (unskilled) immigrants hampers this process and can lead
to worse economic outcomes; in particular to lower wages (for empirical evidence
see Edin, et al. [11] and Borjas [5]).
Define the enclave as the residential neighborhood where unskilled immigrants
cluster, and let 0 ≤ nu ≤ 1 represent the fraction of people who settle in the it.
Suppose that w̃uc (nu) is the wage earned by an immigrant who lives in the enclave.
Let J (nu) ∈ [0, K] be the cost of finding a job for an immigrant of the enclave.
Assume that individuals within the enclave share information about potential jobs,
and that an informal network of job contacts emerges. Further, suppose that the
larger the enclave, the ‘thicker’ the network and the lower the cost to an individual
of finding a job: J ′ (nu) < 0 and J
′′(nu) > 0 (thus J (0) = K and J (1) = 0 ).
5 I
5For empirical evidence on the efficiency of these ethnic networks in channeling job information
see Munshi [21] and Waldinger and Lichter ([31], p. 83, 104-105).
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assume that immigrants derive utility from sharing common culture. This benefit
is captured by the function h (nu) with h
′ (nu) > 0 and h
′′(nu) < 0. The sign of the
second derivative suggests some crowding effect as more people move to the enclave.
For example, if too many people settle in the enclave, it may be harder to get a
spot for the kids in the bilingual school of the neighborhood. Thus the utility of
an unskilled immigrant who settles in the enclave equals:
Uuc (nu) = w̃uc (nu)− J (nu) + h (nu) (2.1)
Suppose that an immigrant who goes to a neighborhood where natives are
majority assimilates. Let the costs/benefits of assimilation be given by b. b < 0
corresponds to the costs of acquiring the host country skills, or learning the language
and the social norms of natives. In contrast b > 0 represents the benefits of learning
the social norms of natives, which for example, might prevent the immigrant from
being discriminated against; b > 0 could also account for the gains derived from
having access to high quality public services (e.g. schools). Suppose that an
immigrant who assimilates faces a job finding cost equal to K and receives wage
w̃us (nu). Therefore the utility received by an unskilled immigrant who assimilates
is:
Uus (nu) = w̃us (nu)−K + b (2.2)
I assume that the general labor market works as follows. All immigrants,
assimilated or not, compete for jobs. There are a large number of firms hiring
both immigrants and natives. Suppose that there are language complementarities
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in production: If a worker speaks English his marginal product is MPh, and if he
does not then his marginal product is MPl < MPh.6 If language ability is fully
observable, then a worker that speaks English earns wus = MPh and one that does
not receives wuc = MPl. Suppose that the only characteristic of a worker that
is observable to the employers is her ethnicity. Then all employers pay natives
wus = MPh. However, the employers cannot tell apart those immigrants who
assimilate from those who do not. The information available to firms is that a
fraction nu of immigrants lives in the enclave and therefore, do not speak English.
They also know that an immigrant who assimilates reveals to his boss that he speaks
English with some positive probability 0 < β < 1.7
The average productivity and therefore the expected wage of immigrants who
do not reveal is:
w = Pr [low|reveal = 0] ∗MPl + Pr [high|reveal = 0] ∗MPh (2.3)
=
nu
nu + (1− nu) (1− β)
wuc +
(1− nu) (1− β)





< 0, the larger the enclave, the lower the fraction of the workers that are
6In their study of the immigrant labor market in the area of Los Angeles, Waldinger and Lichter
([31], p. 69-72) conclude that the job assignment of an immigrant (and consequently the wage)
depends on her fluency in the English language.
7This setup could be thought of as a reduced form model of statistical discrimination (e.g.
Aigner and Cain [1]). All immigrants must take a test that measures imperfectly the likelihood that
a person speaks English. While immigrants who do not assimilate fail the exam with probability
1, those who assimilate pass the exam only with probability β.
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assimilated among the pool of individuals who do not reveal, the lower the wage for
the individual who does not assimilate. An immigrant who assimilates expects to
receive wage w̃us equal to:
w̃us (nu) = βwus + (1− β)w̃uc (nu) (2.4)
for w̃uc (nu) given by equation (2.3). Notice
∂w̃us
∂nu
= (1− β) ∂w̃uc
∂nu
< 0. For a given β,
the larger the enclave, the lower the pooling wage w̃uc (nu), the lower w̃us (nu). Using
(2.2) and (2.4) it is straightforward to show that ∂Uus
∂nu
< 0. Not always being able
to differentiate from the enclave immigrant in the labor market, the individual that
assimilates faces a negative externality from the enclave in the labor market, which
is larger for higher nu (enclave size). Because w̃us (nu) ≤ wus, w̃us (nu) ≥ w̃uc (nu)
and thus assimilated immigrants receive wages no lower than the wage of a person
living in the enclave.






− J ′ (nu) + h′ (nu) > 0
∴ h′ (nu)− J ′ (nu) >
∣∣∣∣∂w̃uc∂nu
∣∣∣∣





= (1− β) ∂w̃uc
∂nu
< 0. Additionally I assume that
∣∣∣ ∂J∂nu ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∂w̃uc∂nu ∣∣∣ <∣∣∣ ∂J∂nu ∣∣∣+ h′ (nu).
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2.2.2 The Game: Residential Location Choice
I specify a simultaneous-move game. Immigrants decide independently and
noncooperatively whether to settle in the enclave or among natives. An enclave n∗u
is a NE if for such n∗u an immigrant’s best response is to settle in the enclave (i.e.
Uuc(n
∗
u) ≥ Uus(n∗u)). Given that a fraction nu of immigrants go to the enclave, an
individual settles in the enclave if the utility he receives there is larger than the utility
he derives from assimilation (Uuc(nu) ≥ Uus(nu)), otherwise if Uus(nu) > Uuc(nu) his
best response is to assimilate.
Suppose that no one goes to the enclave (nu = 0) then the wages of all im-
migrants are w̃us (0) = w̃uc (0) = wus. If there are no benefits from assimilation
other than high wages, i.e. if b < 0, then all immigrants strictly prefer to settle in
the enclave (Uus (0) < Uuc (0)); and in that case living out of the enclave is never
a Nash Equilibrium. When nu = 0 and b < 0 an immigrant has the incentive to
unilaterally deviate and settle in the enclave. In doing so he free rides on the high
wages received by his co-ethnics and forgoes the assimilation cost b. In contrast
if assimilation translates not only into higher wages but also into being (socially)
less discriminated against (b > 0), then no enclave forming can be a NE: for nu = 0
if b > 0 it is a Best Response to assimilate (and thus n∗u = 0). The following
propositions formalize the results.
Proposition 2.1. If b < 0 then the unique NE is the enclave forming (n∗u = 1).
Proof. All proofs are in the appendix.
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Immigrant groups that are likely to be discriminated against, or for whom
b < 0, do not to assimilate, and instead cluster in an ethnic neighborhood at the
expense of earning low wages. As an example consider the Haitian refugees that
arrived to Miami in 1980. They were black and unskilled and chose to cluster in an
ethnic neighborhood. They faced racial discrimination, and ultimately remained
unemployed or held jobs at very low wages (Portes and Stepick [24]).
Proposition 2.2. Let h (1) > b −K. If b > 0 and wus − wuc ≥ h(1)−b+Kβ then the
unique Nash equilibrium is everyone assimilating (n∗u = 0).
Suppose everyone is going to the enclave and nu = 1. When all immigrants
go to the enclave if the wage differential net of search costs (w̃us (1)− w̃uc (1)−K)
is sufficiently large to offset the relative benefits of sharing common culture (i.e.
h (1) − b), then it is individually optimal to assimilate. This incentive is stronger
when assimilated workers are more likely to reveal as such (i.e. when β high). Larger
β leads to higher wages for assimilated people (w̃us) and lower for those who live in
the enclave (w̃uc). If at nu = 1 the opposite happens, i.e. if the wage differential
is no larger than the relative benefits of sharing common culture, then both the
enclave forming and everyone assimilating are NE of the game.
Proposition 2.3. Let h (1) > b − K. If b > 0 and wus − wuc < h(1)−b+Kβ then
multiple equilibria exist:
i. no enclave forming is a NE, n∗u = 0;
ii. the enclave forming is a NE, n∗u = 1 , and
iii. the enclave forming with n∗u ∈ (0, 1) is a NE.
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When the wage differential is no larger than the (highest) net benefits of culture
(h (1) − b) then multiple equilibria emerge: If no one goes to the enclave, then an
individual prefers not to go to the enclave. In contrast, when she expects all others
to go to the enclave, then her best response is to settle in the enclave. And there
is an nu ∈ (0, 1) where the person is indifferent between settling in the enclave or
out of it. For such nu the wage differential is identical to the cultural gains in the
enclave. For given (wus, wuc, h (1) , b,K) higher β make it more likely for a group
to assimilate.
According to the model then the existence of ethnic enclaves of unskilled peo-
ple (e.g. Mexicans) in the U.S. is partly driven by the inability of the employers
to tell apart the assimilated immigrants. Lower β decreases the wages of assimi-
lated immigrants and makes assimilation less attractive.8 Under what conditions
is assimilation socially preferred to clustering? The next proposition addresses this
question.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that the conditions in proposition 2.3 are satisfied. If
h (1) − b + K < wus − wuc < h(1)−b+Kβ then the enclave equilibrium is a ‘trap’.
The equilibrium in which all immigrants spread-out Pareto-dominates the enclave
8One possible solution to β being low is for the employers to hire a bilingual supervisor at a
low cost. Although not modeled directly, we could imagine that the interaction with the bilingual
supervisor raises the marginal productivity of all enclave workers. Indeed there is empirical
evidence of sweatshops in the area of Los Angeles, where bilingual supervisors are hired to interact
with Latino workers in order to improve their productivity through more effective communication
(Waldinger and Lichter [31] p. 69).
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equilibrium. If wus − wuc < h (1) − b + K, then the enclave equilibrium Pareto-
dominates the assimilation equilibrium.
If assimilation translates into sufficiently high wages, then the enclave equi-
librium is a trap. In contrast if the wage premium from assimilation is not too
large relative to the cultural benefits of the enclave, then the assimilation equilib-
rium is the ‘bad’ equilibrium. Thus if the wage gap is in an intermediate range,
immigrants are socially better off assimilating. However, this equilibrium may fail
to be achieved if there is a lack of coordination among immigrants.9 For given
assimilation benefit (b) and job finding cost (K), when all immigrants assimilate,
the gains from assimilation are the largest possible because everyone earns the same
wage as natives (wus); in contrast, when all individuals go to the enclave wages
are very low (wuc), but the benefits from common culture are the largest possible
(Uuc (1) = wuc + h (1)).
From the conditions in propositions (2.2) to (2.4), if employers can readily
assess assimilation (i.e. β is close to 1) and can reward it properly (i.e. if wus −
wuc is sufficiently large) then immigrants will assimilate: the region of wus − wuc
for which multiple equilibria exist shrinks as β goes to 1, and the assimilation
equilibrium is more likely to emerge as the unique equilibrium. If the government
could observe better the ability of immigrants to ‘speak’ English relative to the
employers, for example because it gives a more comprehensive set of exams, then
9In the next section I introduce skill heterogeneity among immigrants and show that having a
labor market in the enclave improves the outcomes of unskilled immigrants, and furthermore, that
the enclave equilibrium is always the socially preferred equilibrium.
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residential clustering would be less likely to occur.
2.3 A Game with Residential and Entrepreneurial Clustering
In this section I allow for skill heterogeneity in the immigrant pool. Specifically
I consider two types of immigrants: skilled (h) and unskilled (u). Let nh denote the
fraction of immigrants who move to the enclave in equilibrium. The presence of
skilled immigrants in the enclave increases the benefits of clustering for the unskilled
co-ethnics in two basic ways: first, skilled immigrants who settle in the enclave
become entrepreneurs and create a demand for unskilled labor. Workers filling in
these jobs receive training and financial advice from their employers and eventually
move on to start their own businesses.10 Thus jobs in the enclave give unskilled
immigrants the opportunity to gain upward mobility without assimilation. Second,
skilled agents start up immigrant-oriented businesses including legal advice, credit
unions or healthcare services that further raise the benefit of living in the enclave(








. These assumptions are based on studies by
sociologists on ethnic enclaves (e.g. Light and Gold [20]).
2.3.1 Setup
For d < 1 let nh ∈ [0, d] be the fraction of skilled individuals who locate in
the enclave. The assumptions on the unskilled population are the same as those
of the previous section. I describe an enclave with a vector (nu, nh). Immigrants
10There is extensive evidence on self-employment in immigrant communities (e.g. Koreans and
Cubans ), see Light and Gold [20].
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can either live in the enclave (c) or out of it (s). Once they make their residential
choice (c or s), they decide where to work: each immigrant can work in the enclave
or in the general labor market (c or s). The place where an immigrant chooses to
live affects his labor market outcomes.
I specify a game as follows: first immigrants decide independently and non-
cooperatively where to settle; and then they decide where to work. Once location
choices have been made an enclave labor market emerges.
The production technology in the enclave is as follows. If an entrepreneur hires
an unskilled worker they produce two units of output (q (unskilled, skilled) = 2),
which yield some revenue 2y > 0. If the entrepreneur decides to be self-employed,
then he produces one unit of output (q (skilled) = 1) for which he receives y. And
the unskilled person by herself produces no output q (unskilled) = 0. Hence the
production technology in the enclave is described by:
q (unskilled, skilled) = 2
q (skilled) = 1
q (unskilled) = 0
Let wx denote the clearing wage in the enclave labor market. I assume that the
cost of finding a job in the enclave is zero, because the ethnic network channels
information on these jobs more effectively than it does on jobs out of the enclave.
Language complementarities between an entrepreneur and a co-ethnic worker allow
for upward mobility without assimilation: workers initially earn wx, and after a
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fraction d of time, they become self-employed and earn income y ≥ wx. Given
that an unskilled person spends a fraction of time d < 1 with the entrepreneur, the
entrepreneur requires of 1/d unskilled individuals to produce 2 units of output (and
thus nh ∈ [0, d]).
The enclave wage wx follows a reduced-form bargaining model. Define θ =
dnu
nh
as the ratio of labor supply and demand within the enclave. If there is excess
labor supply in the enclave (θ > 1) entrepreneurs have more bargaining power
and pay workers a wage equal their outside option, which is the wage they would
receive in the general labor market net of the job finding cost. Hence for dnu > nh,
θ > 1 the enclave wage is wx = w̃uc (nu, nh) − J (nu, nh). When there is no excess
labor demand or supply (dnu = nh, θ = 1) parties have equal bargaining power and
the wage equals the wage an immigrant would receive in the general labor market
(wx = wus −K). If there is excess labor demand workers have more bargaining
power and get half of the production surplus wx = y. Summarizing,
= y if dnu < nh (2.5a)
wx = wus −K if dnu = nh (2.5b)
= w̃uc (nu, nh)− J (nu, nh) if dnu > nh (2.5c)
Let b > 0. When there is no excess labor supply or demand (θ = 1) unskilled
immigrants who locate in the enclave always find jobs in it. They receive wage
wx = wus − K. Let Uuc(nu, nh) represent the utility received by an unskilled
individual who lives and works in the enclave. This utility is equal to:
Uuc (nu, nh) = d (wus −K) + (1− d)y + h (nu, nh)
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For any 0 ≤ nu, nh ≤ 1 the utility received by an unskilled individual who lives
and works in the enclave must be no larger than that of a self-employed immigrant
Uself (nu, nh) where
Uself (nu, nh) = y + h (nu, nh)
and thus y ≥ wus −K. An immigrant who settles in the enclave and works in the
general labor market earns utility:
Uuc,out (nu, nh) = wus −K + h (nu, nh)
and all immigrants who settle in the enclave prefer to work in it so that Uuc (.) ≥
Uuc,out (.). If only one immigrant chooses to work out of the enclave then he receives
wage w̃uc (0) = wus. If the immigrant assimilates and works in the general labor
market, he derives utility:
Uus (nu, nh) = wus + b−K
where wus = w̃us (0). Finally if the assimilated immigrant works in the enclave he
receives utility equal to:
Uus,in = d (wus −K) + (1− d)y + b−K
When there is excess labor demand (θ < 1) all unskilled immigrants find jobs
in the enclave and wx = y. Then the utilities derived from each option become:
Uuc (nu, nh) = y + h (nu, nh)
Uuc,out (nu, nh) = wus −K + h (nu, nh)
Uus (nu, nh) = wus + b−K
Uus,in (nu, nh) = y + b−K
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When there is excess labor supply (θ > 1) unskilled immigrants who settle in
the enclave find jobs in it only with probability 0 < 1
θ
< 1. A fraction nu − nhd of
unskilled persons search for jobs in the general labor market. Thus:
Uuc (nu, nh) =
1
θ
[dwx + (1− d)y] +
θ − 1
θ
[w̃uc (nu, nh)− J (nu, nh)] + h (nu, nh)
Uuc,out (nu, nh) = w̃uc (nu, nh)− J (nu, nh) + h (nu, nh)
Uus (nu, nh) = w̃us (nu, nh) + b−K
Uus,in (nu, nh) =
1
θ
[dwx + (1− d)y] +
θ − 1
θ
w̃us (nu, nh) + b−K
A skilled immigrant can live in the enclave and become an entrepreneur, live
in the enclave or work out of it, live out of the enclave and work in the general
labor market or live out and work in the enclave. When labor demand equals labor
supply (θ = 1), all entrepreneurs hire workers and pay wage wx = wus −K. Given
such (nu, nh) an entrepreneur earns utility Uhc equal to:
Uhc (nu, nh) = 2y − (wus −K) + h (nu, nh)
If the skilled individual decides to assimilate, then he earns utility:
Uhs (nu, nh) = Uhs = wh + bh − Z
here bh > 0 is the benefit of assimilation and Z > 0 is the cost of finding a job in
the general labor market. Let Uhs (nu, nh) > Uus (nu, nh) so that skilled immigrants
gain more from assimilating relative to unskilled individuals. This assumption
suggests that the monetary and non-monetary benefits from assimilation are larger
for a doctor (skilled) than for a janitor (unskilled person). If the skilled individual
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lives in the enclave and decides to work out of it he receives utility:
Uhc,out = wus −K + h (nu, nh)
= Uuc,out
Without assimilation, the skilled immigrant competes with unskilled co-ethnics
in the general labor market. Finally if the immigrant assimilates and decides to
become an entrepreneur in the enclave, he receives utility:
Uhs,in (nu, nh) = 2y − (wus −K) + bh − Z
When there is excess labor demand (θ < 1) an entrepreneur is matched to
an unskilled worker with probability θ and pays him wage wx = y. For θ < 1 the
utilities become:
Uhc (nu, nh) = y + h (nu, nh)
Uhs (nu, nh) = Uhs = wh + bh − Z
Uhc,out = wus −K + h (nu, nh)
Uhs,in (nu, nh) = y + bh − Z
If there is excess labor supply in the enclave (θ > 1) all entrepreneurs are
guaranteed to get workers. In that case the enclave wage is wx = w̃uc (nu, nh) −
J (nu, nh) for w̃uc (nu, nh) − J (nu, nh) ≤ y. When there is excess labor supply the
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alternatives available to a skilled immigrant yield utilities equal to:
Uhc (nu, nh) = 2y − [w̃uc (nu, nh)− J (nu, nh)] + h (nu, nh)
Uhs (nu, nh) = Uhs = wh + bh − Z
Uhc,out = w̃uc (nu, nh)− J (nu, nh) + h (nu, nh)
Uhs,in (nu, nh) = 2y − [w̃uc (nu, nh)− J (nu, nh)] + bh − Z
2.3.2 The Game: Residential and Workplace Decisions
I now solve for the Nash Equilibria of the game. For i = u, h and given
(nu, nh) an immigrant decides to live and work in the enclave only if:
Uic(nu, nh) ≥ Uis(nu, nh) for i = u, h
≥ Uic,out (nu, nh)
≥ Uis,in (nu, nh)
The full enclave (1, d) is a NE if for such (1, d) an immigrant’s best response
is to settle and work in the enclave. Similarly, full assimilation (0, 0) is a NE if
given (0, 0) an immigrant’s best response is to assimilate and work in the general
economy. Denote a NE enclave by (n∗u, n
∗




h) < (1, d)
is an interior NE if first, for such (n∗u, n
∗
h) all immigrants are indifferent between
settling and working in the enclave or living and working out of it; and second, all
immigrants (weakly) prefer either option to living and working in different areas.
Define 0 ≤ nucrit, nhcrit ≤ 1 such that an immigrant is indifferent between locating
in the enclave or out of it, i.e. for i = u, h Uic(nucrit, nhcrit) = Uis(nucrit, nhcrit).
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The first result of the model is that there exist NE with no excess labor supply
or demand in the enclave, i.e. 0 ≤ n∗u =
n∗h
d
≤ 1. These equilibria emerge when
the wage skilled immigrants receive out of the enclave (wh) is large, and when
the cultural benefits of the enclave are smaller than the non-monetary gains from
assimilation for unskilled immigrants (i.e. when b ≥ h (nu, nh)).
NE with no excess labor supply or demand emerge if the workers in the enclave
get upward mobility at a speed equal to d̂ = Uhs−Uus−(y−wus+K)
y−wus+K , where Uus = wus +
b−K. If it takes longer for an individual to gain upward mobility in the enclave,
i.e. if d > d̂, then the person prefers to assimilate and the enclave is no longer
an equilibrium. An unskilled immigrant gets upward mobility faster (i.e. d̂ is
smaller) when the entrepreneur is able to extract more rents from the him (i.e.
when y−wus +K is large) and when the utility he receives if he assimilates is large
(Uus). Therefore, holding all other variables fixed, an increase in the value of output
(y), for example due to improvements in the production technology, increases the
rents received by the entrepreneurs and allows unskilled immigrants to become self-
employed faster (d̂ decreases). Finally, if a skilled immigrant assimilates, he receives
utility Uhs. And the higher this utility is, the larger the share of the worker’s surplus
that he as an entrepreneur must receive in order for him to locate in the enclave
(i.e. d̂ is increasing in Uhs). The following proposition formalizes these results.
Proposition 2.5. For b > 0 let wus −K ≤ y , wh ≥ 2y −wus +K and bh ≥ Z. If
Uhs > y + b and
d =
Uhs − y − b
y − wus +K
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then i. no enclave forming is an equilibrium (n∗u = n
∗
h = 0);
ii. The enclave forming is an equilibrium (n∗u = 1, n
∗
h = d);
iii. An interior equilibrium exists with 0 < n∗h = dn
∗
u < d; and
iv. The enclave is Pareto-superior to the assimilation equilibrium.
Allowing for skill heterogeneity in the pool of immigrants leads to an improve-
ment in the economic outcomes of unskilled immigrants who live in the enclave in
comparison to a situation in which the all immigrants are unskilled. In the enclave
with skilled immigrants, unskilled individuals can get upward mobility without as-
similation. Consequently in this setup the enclave is no longer a trap or a ‘bad’
equilibrium, regardless of skill all immigrants are better off moving to the enclave.
Although the wage in the enclave (wx = wus −K) is lower than that of the gen-
eral labor market (w̃uc (0) = wus), unskilled immigrants are better off settling in the
enclave because they still get upward mobility and additionally, they derive bene-
fit from sharing common culture. At the same time, having entrepreneurs in the
enclave reduces its negative externality on the wages of assimilated unskilled indi-
viduals; in fact for n∗h = dn
∗
u the negative externality completely disappears and
w̃us (nu) = wus.
The second result of the model is that there exists an interior NE with excess
labor supply in the enclave, i.e. 0 <
n∗h
d






. This θ emerges if the wage of a
skilled and assimilated immigrant (wh) is sufficiently large, if the value of the enclave
output y is high and if unskilled immigrants spend a relatively large fraction of time
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in the job (i.e. if d is high). Thus enclaves with excess labor supply may fail to
form if the value of the output produced in them is too low. When that occurs,
workers need stay even longer with an entrepreneur (d has to be very large) so that
the skilled person’s utility from living and working in the enclave is large enough
to discourage him from assimilating. Furthermore when d is too large unskilled
individuals could choose not to settle in the enclave. If the rents extracted by
the entrepreneur are large, then more skilled immigrants will have the incentive to
settle in the enclave and the equilibrium excess labor supply will be smaller (i.e. θ is
decreasing in (y − w̃uc (.) + J (.))). Finally, as the utility received by an assimilated
skilled immigrant gets larger, the excess labor supply in the enclave increases. The
next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2.6. For b > 0 let wus −K < y, wh >> y and
h (1, d) ≥ max {b− (1− d) (y − wus +K) ;Uhs − 2y + wus −K}
then i. no enclave forming is an equilibrium (n∗u = n
∗
h = 0);
ii. The enclave forming is an equilibrium (n∗u = 1, n
∗
h = d);
iii. An interior equilibrium exists with 0 < n∗h < dn
∗









(1− d) [y − w̃uc (.)]− dJ (.)
2 [y − w̃uc (.)]− Uhs + w̃us (.) + b−K − J (.)
iv. The enclave is Pareto-superior to the assimilation equilibrium.
The presence of immigrant entrepreneurs in the enclave improves the economic
outcomes of all unskilled co-ethnics. The quality of the enclave affects the economic
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outcomes of all immigrants. Even unskilled persons that assimilate benefit from
the presence of the entrepreneurs because fewer co-ethnics who live in the enclave
end up working in the general labor market. For a given probability of a worker
revealing as assimilated (β), the fewer enclave people working in the general labor
market, the higher the average marginal productivity of workers who do not reveal,
the higher the wages for all immigrants in the general market.
The benefits of the enclaves with entrepreneurs are apparent: Portes and
Stepick [24] compare black Cubans and Haitians who arrived to Miami in 1980
and find that the Cubans were able to find jobs in the Cuban enclave, and even
comparable jobs in the general economy. In contrast the Haitians, who did not
have an ethnic economy, experienced high rates of unemployment and operated
mostly in the informal economy. An extreme case of proposition 2.6 is an equilib-
rium given by n∗u = 1 and n
∗
h = 0, in which sorting by skill occurs. All unskilled
immigrants cluster, while the skilled ones assimilate. This type of equilibrium is
consistent with the recent wave of Chinese migration into the U.S.: highly skilled
and educated individuals assimilate, while very low skilled people tend to cluster
(Karas [18]).
Finally no equilibrium exists in which there is excess labor demand in the
enclave. If there were excess labor demand, then the wage would be wx = y
and skilled and unskilled immigrants in the enclave would all earn the same (self-
employment) utility: Uuc (.) = Uhc (.) = Uself (.) = y + h (nu, nh). For an enclave
with excess labor demand (dnu < nh) to be an equilibrium we require Uus(.) =
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Uuc (.) = Uhc (.) = Uhs. But this equality can never hold because by assumption
Uus(.) < Uhs. Skilled immigrants do not cluster by themselves. They find enclaves
attractive because they can hire co-ethnics fairly easily. The ethnic network that
emerges in the enclave seems to be a stronger magnet for unskilled people than for
skilled persons (Portes and Rumbaut [27]). For example, Filipino immigrants who
are highly skilled (typically doctors) have never formed ethnic enclaves (Karas [18]).
One possible explanation for why enclaves with excess labor demand never form is
that language complementarities in the general labor market are stronger for skilled
people than for unskilled persons. Hence skilled people are more likely to assimilate
relative to unskilled individuals. In fact, Lang et al. [3] find that among Russian
immigrants in Israel, the value of learning Hebrew is large for skilled individuals and
close to zero for unskilled people.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I construct a model to study the effect that residential location
choices have on the economic outcomes of immigrants. It is a game in which immi-
grants decide simultaneously and independently where to settle. I start by analyzing
the strategic decisions of an homogeneous group of unskilled immigrants. When the
benefits of assimilation come only through higher wages, immigrants decide to settle
in an enclave. In order for immigrants to be willing to assimilate, they must perceive
some positive non-monetary benefit from assimilation (such as less discrimination in
their social endeavor). When there are monetary and non-monetary benefits from
55
assimilation, and when employers in the general labor market are unlikely to screen
out the assimilated immigrants, then multiple equilibria emerge. And in such case,
it is very likely that the enclave equilibrium is a poverty trap. Immigrants may end
up forming the enclave because of a lack of coordination in their decisions, although
they could all be better off if they assimilated.
I then modify the game so that both skilled and unskilled immigrants decide
where to settle. I assume that skilled immigrants who settle in the enclave be-
come entrepreneurs and have a positive demand for unskilled labor. Thus adding
skilled immigrants to the model, opens the possibility for a labor market within
the enclave. I show that enclaves that emerge in equilibrium never have excess
labor demand. Skilled people have a stronger incentive to assimilate than unskilled
individuals. If the enclave emerges in equilibrium, the speed of upward mobility
of unskilled immigrants is increasing in the value of the output produced in the en-
clave. Furthermore, if the value of the output produced in the enclave is too small,
then the enclave may fail to form. For prevailing wages in the general economy, en-
clave entrepreneurs have the incentive to produce output that has more technology
embedded because they can then extract larger rents from the workers. Finally the
results of the model suggest that when immigrants with a mix of skills settle in the
enclave, the enclave equilibrium is the socially-preferred outcome. When skilled
immigrants locate in the enclave, the quality of the enclave improves and it is no
longer a trap (all individuals are better-off clustering).
Throughout the analysis I assume that immigrants make decisions indepen-
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dently. Although in the model an individual takes into account the social gains of
clustering when making his decision, this approach may conflict with the empirical
evidence, which shows that the decision of one individual to migrate is conditioned
on the decisions of others in his social network (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut [27] and
Munshi [21]). One way to reconcile my approach with the evidence is to partition
the fraction of immigrants who settle in the enclave in smaller communities. Coor-
dination among members of a community could lead them to get out of the enclave
trap whenever it is likely to emerge. As the community gets larger, coordination
becomes harder, and in that case the results of my model would remain unchanged.
Two policy recommendations emerge from this analysis. The first is that if
the pool of immigrants is uniformly unskilled, then the government can help native
employers in screening out unskilled immigrants who assimilate. For example the
government could provide immigrants with English lessons and then give a compre-
hensive examinations which would be required for employment. The second recom-
mendation is that the government could extend credits to immigrant entrepreneurs,
who could improve the technology of their production, allow unskilled co-ethnics
to achieve upward mobility sooner, and also lessen the negative externality that
the enclave imposes on the wages of assimilated unskilled immigrants. And better
technologies available to the enclave entrepreneurs guarantee that the enclave forms,
which prevents the unskilled people from clustering by themselves and earning very
low wages in the general labor market.
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Chapter A
Proofs of Propositions of Chapter 1
Proof of proposition 1.1. The Nash equilibrium in efforts of the second stage is













for all i ∈ N (A.1)
In this game I consider Star networks (gS = {12, 23}) with symmetric Nash equilibria
in which e∗1 = e
∗
3 . The profile of NE efforts in these networks is represented by




1). All the analysis that follows looks at two players only, assuming
that players 1 and 3 behave identically.











∣∣∣ = ∂ei∂ej < 1 for i 6= j, i, j (A.2)
The condition A.2 has two implications: first, because efforts are strategic comple-
ments then any BRi is increasing in ej if sij > 0. Second, the absolute value of the
slope of the reaction function of any player is less than one.
Under the assumptions made on the payoff functions the uniqueness condition












Suppose that (ê1, ê1, ê1) is the NE. The payoff to player 1 (corner) in the Star
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network is:
Y S1 = B(e1;N
S




s12. Taking the first order condition and using the symmetry between











































The payoff to player 2 is:
Y S2 = B(e2;N
S
2 ) +K(e2, e1, s12; γ) +K(e2, e3, s12; γ)− ∂π(e2, NS2 ;µ, f)
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where the last equality follows from substituting A.3 in A.4.
Given that own effort and links are strategic complements in both B(.) and
C(.), and NS2 > N
S

























































= (ê1, ê1, ê1)
would not be a NE.
At e2 = ê1, the marginal cost of effort for the center of the Star is larger than
the marginal benefits, thus it is optimal for the agent to select some effort level
ê2 < ê1. Since
∂2K(e1,e1,s12;γ)
∂e1∂e2
> 0, player 1 would respond to ê2 by decreasing his
effort too. Given that A.2 holds, player 1 decreases his effort by less than the initial
















Given the existence of a NE in which e∗1 > e
∗
2, any equilibrium of the form e
∗
2 >
e∗1 is ruled out. The latter equilibrium would require that around its neighborhood
the (absolute value of the) slope of at least one of the reaction functions be greater
than 1, which would violate A.2.
Proof of proposition 1.2. I now compare crime efforts across networks. Any crimi-
nal in the complete network has two links and is a step away from any other criminal.
Similarly, in the Star network, the center has two links and is only a step away from
the other two criminals ( Ncenter = N
C
i = 2, s(center, j) = s (i, j) = s12, j = 1, 3).






























































Substituting A.6 in A.7 and for e∗center < e
∗

















e∗center is not the NE effort level of criminals in the complete network. At e
∗
center the
marginal cost of effort is larger than the marginal benefit. Thus the NE effort levels





In the complete network all nodes have two links, and are one step away from
each other. Therefore payoffs are symmetric. Without loss of generality consider
player 1’s payoff for given e2:












3 , s12; γ)− π(eC1 , NC1 ;µ, f)
= 2
[




2 , γ, s12)− π(eC1 , 1;µ, f)
]
with e2 = e3, s12 = s13(A.8)
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using H.O.D.1 of B(.) and π(.) in N gi and symmetry.
In the single-link network, gI = {12}, only two agents are connected. The
payoff to player 1 in this network is:








2, s12; γ)− π(eC1 , NC1 ;µ, f)




2, γ, s12)− π(eI1, 1;µ, f) (A.9)
From A.8 and A.9, Y C1 = 2Y
I
1 . The payoff of the complete network is an increasing
monotonic transformation of that of a connected node in the single-link network.
Thus for given (e2, e3), if e
∗








Proofs of Propositions of Chapter 2
Proof of proposition 2.1. For nu = 0: Uus(0) = wus+b−K and Uuc(0) = wus−K. If
b < 0 then Uuc(0) > Uus(0) and an immigrant unilaterally deviated and settles in the
enclave. Consequently everyone assimilating (n∗u = 0) is never a Nash Equilibrium
(NE). Given that ∂Uus
∂nu
< 0 and ∂Uuc
∂nu
> 0 then for nu > 0 Uuc(nu) > Uus(nu).
Therefore, if b < 0, for 0 ≤ nu ≤ 1, it is always a best response to go to the enclave.
Thus n∗u = 1 is the unique Nash Equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 2.2. For b > 0 and nu = 0: Uus(0) = wus + b − K > wus −
K = Uuc(0), all immigrants assimilating is a Nash Equilibrium. Now I show that
if h (1) > b − K and wus − wuc ≥ h(1)−b+Kβ , then full assimilation is the unique
equilibrium. Given that ∂Uus
∂nu
< 0 and ∂Uuc
∂nu
> 0, the lowest possible utility received
by an immigrant who assimilates is Uus (1), and the highest possible if he settles
in the enclave is Uuc (1). If at nu = 1 Uus (1) ≥ Uuc (1), then all immigrants
weakly prefer to assimilate for any 0 ≤ nu ≤ 1. Notice Uus (1) = wus + b − K −
(1− β) (wus − wuc) ≥ wuc + h (1) = Uuc (1) ∴ β (wus − wuc) ≥ h (1) − b + K > 0,
which holds given the assumptions above.
Proof of proposition 2.3. For b > 0 all immigrants assimilating is a Nash Equilib-
rium. By assumption h (1) > b − K and wus − wuc < h(1)−b+Kβ . Is the enclave
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forming also a NE? Uuc(1) = wuc + h (1) ≥ wus + b − K − (1− β) (wus − wuc)
∴ β (wus − wuc) ≤ h (1)− b+K, hence the enclave is a NE if wus−wuc < h(1)−b+Kβ ,
which is always satisfied. If Uus(0) > Uuc (0) and Uuc(1) > Uus(1), then there exists
0 < nu < 1 such that Uuc(nu) = Uus(nu). For given 0 < nu < 1 an immigrant is
indifferent between going to the enclave or assimilating, and thus 0 < n∗u < 1 is an
interior Nash Equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 2.4. By assumption both the enclave and full assimilation are
NE of the game. All immigrants are better off assimilating when Uus(0) > Uuc (1) .
Equivalently, Uus(0) = wus+b−K > wuc+h (1) = Uuc(1), which holds for wus−wuc >
h (1) − b + K. The enclave equilibrium is Pareto superior to the assimilation
equilibrium when Uus(0) < Uuc (1), which requires wus − wuc < h (1) − b + K. As
β gets closer to 1, if wus − wuc is not sufficiently large, the assimilation equilibrium
may emerge as the ‘bad’ equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 2.5. Using the conditions b > 0, wus−K ≤ y , 2y−wus +K ≤
wh ≤ 2y , b−K ≤ bh − Z ≤ b, Uhs > y + b and





y − wus +K − (b− bh + Z)
wh − y
,
Uhs − y − wus +K − b
y
}
I show that three equilibria exist: i. n∗u = n
∗




h = d ; and iii.
0 < dn∗u = n
∗




h) = 0 is a NE. Given
(n∗u, n
∗




h) = 0: Uuc (0, 0) = Uuc,out (0, 0) = wus −K and Uus (0, 0) = Uus,in (0, 0) =
wus − K + b. These equations imply that Uus (0, 0) > Uuc (0, 0) = Uuc,out (0, 0)
and Uus (0, 0) ≥ Uus,in (0, 0). For (n∗u, n∗h) = 0 the best response of an unskilled
immigrant is to assimilate and work out of the enclave. Now I show that it is also
a best response for a skilled immigrant to assimilated and work in the general labor
market when (n∗u, n
∗




h) = 0 Uhc (0, 0) = y, Uhs = wh + bh − Z ,
Uhc,out = Uuc,out and Uhs,in = y+ bh−Z. By assumption Uhs > y, and thus a skilled
immigrant prefers to assimilated and work out of the enclave. And he prefers this
alternative to either of the other two options: Uhc,out (0, 0) = wus −K < y < Uhs,
and Uhs,in (0, 0) = y + bh − Z < Uhs since wh > y. Thus (n∗u, n∗h) = 0 is a NE.
The second step is to show that 0 < dn∗u = n
∗
h < d is a NE. An unskilled









h) + (1− d) y+h (n∗u, n∗h), Uus (n∗u, n∗h) = wus + b−K, Uuc,out = wus−K+
h (n∗u, n
∗








h)+(1− d) y+b−K. Given (n∗u, n∗h) < (1, d)
an unskilled immigrant is indifferent between living and working in the enclave













h) = y −
Uhs−wus−b+K
1+d
. This equilibrium wage is always
non-negative because by assumption Uhs−wus−b+K−y
y
≥ d. The person strictly





















− y. Now b ≥ dUhs−wus−b+K
1+d
− y
only if d ≤ y−wus+K
Uhs−y−b
∴ wh ≥ 2y − wus + K , and this inequality holds by as-




h) ≥ Uuc,out (n∗u, n∗h). Finally, an unskilled immigrant
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h) ≥ Uus,in (n∗u, n∗h) ∴ Uuc (n∗u, n∗h) ≥ Uus,in (n∗u, n∗h) ∴ h (n∗u, n∗h) ≥ b − K.
This last condition holds whenever h (n∗u, n
∗
h) ≥ bh − Z ≥ b − K. Below I prove
that this is the case. Now I show that for 0 < dn∗u = n
∗
h < d a skilled immigrant is
indifferent between settling and working in the enclave or out of it, and prefers either
option to all others. Given (n∗u, n
∗
h) < (1, d) the alternatives available to a skilled in-

















h) = 2y−wx (n∗u, n∗h) +K+ bh−Z.
Given the enclave (n∗u, n
∗
h) < (1, d) a skilled immigrant is indifferent between living




h), which is equivalent





− y > 0. A skilled immigrant prefers to settle and


























h < d is a NE.
The third step is to show that everyone locating and working in the en-
clave is also a NE (n∗u = 1, n
∗
h = d). Start with the unskilled immigrants:
Uuc(1, d) = dwx (1, d) + (1− d) y+ h (1, d) ; Uus(1, d) = wus−K + b; Uuc,out (1, d) =
wus − K + h (1, d) and Uus(1, d) = dwx (1, d) + (1− d) y + b − K. Notice that
Uuc(1, d) ≥ Uus(1, d) only if w∗x (1, d) ≥ y − 1d [y − wus +K − b+ h (1, d)] , which





− y and h (.) is increas-
ing in both of its arguments, then h (1, d) ≥ h (n∗u, n∗h) ≥ b ≥ b − K. Hence






h) ≥ Uus,in (n∗u, n∗h) because h (n∗u, n∗h) ≥ b−K. Then h (1, d) > h (n∗u, n∗h) ≥
b−K. Now look at the skilled immigrants. The utilities from all alternatives are:
Uhc(1, d) = 2y−wx (1, d)+h (1, d) ; Uhs(1, d) = Uhs; Uhc,out (1, d) = wus−K+h (1, d)









cause Uhc (nu, nh) is increasing in both of its arguments, then Uhc(1, d) > Uhs. Thus
given (n∗u = 1, n
∗
h = d), the best response of a skilled immigrant is to live and work
in the enclave. Furthermore, Uhc (1, d) ≥ Uuc (1, d) > Uuc,out (1, d) = Uhc,out (1, d),
and Uhc (nu, nh) > Uhs,in (1, d) ∴ h (1, d) ≥ h (n∗u, n∗h) > bh − Z.
Finally, the enclave equilibrium is Pareto-superior to the assimilation equilib-
rium: i. Uus (0, 0) = wus −K + b < dwx (1, d) + (1− d) y + h (1, d) = Uuc(1, d) ∴




h) < Uhc (1, d).
Proof of proposition 2.6. Using the conditions b > 0, y > min [wus −K, w̃us (nu, nh)],
y << wh ≤ 2y and b−K ≤ bh−Z, I show that three equilibria exist: i. n∗u = n∗h = 0;
ii. dn∗u = n
∗




u < d. From the proof of proposition 2.5,
the conditions for the existence of NE n∗u = n
∗




h = 1 are:
wh ≤ 2y (B.1)
h (1, d) ≥ wus + b−K − dUhs
1 + d
− y (B.2)
h (1, d) ≥ b−K (B.3)
h (1, d) ≥ bh − Z (B.4)
y − 1
d
[y − wus +K − b+ h (1, d)] ≤ w∗x (1, d) ≤ 2y − Uhs + h (1, d) (B.5)
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By assumption equations (B.1), (B.2) and (B.5) are satisfied. Two additional con-








y − w̃uc (.) + J (.)− d (wh − y)
w̃us (.)− w̃uc (.) + J (.) + bh − Z
≤ θ∗ (nu, nh) ≤
d [Uhs + w̃us (.)− w̃uc (.) + J (.)]




guarantees that the lower bound of θ is smaller than its upper bound.
Further the upper bound of θ is greater than one if h(n∗u, n
∗
h) > b − K. One
equilibrium condition is that h (n∗u, n
∗
h) ≥ bh − Z, since bh − Z ≥ b −K, then the
conditions for θ > 1 and (B.3)-(B.4) will be met.
I first show that the interior equilibrium exists, and will then show that the
remaining constraints above are met. I now prove that an interior Nash Equi-
librium exists (0 < n∗h < dn
∗
u < d and θ




> 1). For given
(n∗u, n
∗





























h) + (1− d) y] + θ−1θ w̃us (.) + b−K. The util-




h) = 2y − wx (n∗u, n∗h) + J (.) + h (n∗u, n∗h),





h) + J (.) + bh − Z. (n∗u, n∗h) is a NE only if an immigrant is indif-
ferent between living and working in the enclave, or assimilating and working












h) = y +
θ
d


























{θ∗ (.) [w̃us (.) + b−K] + (θ − 1) [y − w̃uc (.) + J (.)]− Uhs}.
An unskilled agent prefers settling and working in the enclave to assimilating and




h) ≥ Uus,in (n∗u, n∗h) ∴ wx (n∗u, n∗h) ≤ y −
1
d
[y − w̃us (.)] ∴ θ ≤ d[Uhs+w̃us(.)−w̃uc(.)+J(.)]d[y−w̃uc(.)+J(.)]+y−w̃us(.)+d[w̃us(.)+b−K] . Similarly, he prefers to live

















Thus given interior (n∗u, n
∗
h) an unskilled person is indifferent between living and
working in the enclave or living and working out of it, and both alternatives are
preferred to all others.
Next, I show that for given (n∗u, n
∗
h) skilled immigrants prefer both to lo-
cate and live in one place, than live and work in different places. In equilib-




h) ≥ Uhs,in (n∗u, n∗h) only if h (n∗u, n∗h) ≥ bh − Z, or equiva-
lently if θ ≥ y−w̃uc(.)+J(.)−d(wh−y)
w̃us(.)−w̃uc(.)+J(.)+bh−Z
, which is satisfied by assumption. But then
h (1, d) ≥ h (n∗u, n∗h) ≥ bh − Z, and so equation (B.4) above is also met and θ > 1.








h) ≤ Uhc (n∗u, n∗h) because y ≥ wx ≥
wus − K ≥ w̃uc (.) − J (.). Therefore, given (n∗u, n∗h) a skilled immigrant is in-
different between living and working in the enclave or out, and both alternatives
are preferred to all others. Thus an interior NE with excess labor supply exists.
Finally because both n∗u = n
∗




h = 1 are NE, and utilities at these
equilibria do not change from those of the proof of proposition (2.5), the enclave
Pareto-dominates assimilation.
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Proof of Proposition ??. Using the conditions b > 0, wus ≤ y << wh ≤ 2y , Uhs >
y + b, b−K ≤ bh − Z, and
d ≥ (y − wus) [Uhs − wus − b+K]
(wh − y) [Uhs − Uus − 2 (y − wus)]
y − 1
d
[y − wus +K − b+ h (1, d)] ≤ w∗x (1, d) ≤ 2y − Uhs + h (1, d)
d [Uhs − y − b]
y − wus +K
≤ θ∗ (nu, nh) ≤
d [Uhs − y − b+K]
y − wus
I show that three equilibria exist: i. n∗u = n
∗




h = 1 ; and
iii. 0 < dn∗u < n
∗
h < d. By assumption equations (B.1), (B.2) and (B.5) are
satisfied. I will show that equations (B.3) and (B.4) are met. First I prove that
an interior Nash Equilibrium exists (0 < dn∗u < n
∗
h < d and θ





For given (n∗u, n
∗
h), the utilities from each possible action taken by an unskilled








h) + (1− d) y + h (n∗u, n∗h), Uus (n∗u, n∗h) =
wus+b−K, Uuc,out = wus−K+h (n∗u, n∗h) and Uus (n∗u, n∗h) = dwx (n∗u, n∗h)+(1− d) y+
b − K. For a skilled immigrant they are: Uhc (n∗u, n∗h) = θ (2y − wx (n∗u, n∗h)) +
(1− θ) y + h (n∗u, n∗h), Uhs = wh + bh −Z, Uhs,in = θ (2y − wx (n∗u, n∗h)) + (1− θ) y +
bh − Z and Uhc,out = Uuc,out = wus − K + h (n∗u, n∗h). An unskilled immigrant is
indifferent between living and working in the enclave and living and working out of















































An unskilled immigrant prefers to live and work in the same place rather than live in








h) ≥ Uuc,out (n∗u, n∗h) ∴
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b ≥ h (n∗u, n∗h) ∴ θ ≥
d[Uhs−y−b]
y−wus+K . He also prefers the former option to assimilating and








h) ≥ Uus,in (n∗u, n∗h) ∴ h (n∗u, n∗h) ≥
b−K ∴ θ ≤ d[Uhs−y−b+K]
y−wus .
A skilled immigrant prefers to live and work in the same place rather than live



























h). A skilled immigrant also prefers to live and work in the same place


























− d ≤ d[Uhs−y−b+K]





h) ≥ Uhs,in (n∗u, n∗h). It remails to show that inequalities (B.3) and








h) ≥ Uus,in (n∗u, n∗h) I find that
h (n∗u, n
∗









h) ≥ bh − Z + (1− θ) (wh − y). Since b − K ≤ bh − Z and
(1− θ) (wh − y) > 0, then h (1, d) ≥ h (n∗u, n∗h) > bh − Z.
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[15] Goyal, S. and J.L. Móraga-González, (2001): ”R&D Networks,” Rand Journal
of Economics, 32 (4): 686-707.
[16] Jackson, M. and A. Watts (2002): ”The evolution of social and economic net-
works,” Journal of Economic Theory, 106: 265-295.
[17] Jackson, M. and A. Wolinsky (1996): ”A strategic model of social and economic
networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, 71: 44-74.
[18] Karas, J. (2002) Bridges and Barriers: Earnings and Occupational Attainment
among Immigrants (The New Americans). New York: LFB Scholarly Publish-
ing LLC.
[19] Lazear, E. (1999) “Culture and language,” Journal of Political Economy ,107
(6):95-126.
[20] Light, I. and S. Gold (2000) Ethnic Economies. San Diego, CA: Academic
Press.
[21] Munshi, K. (2003). “Networks in the modern economy: Mexican migrants in
the U.S. labor market.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (2): 549-597.
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